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that the disunion or diremption is in the subject in general, and that the subject is evil, that it is diremption in itself. The subject is contradiction; not the contradiction which is merely disconnecting, but that which also holds together; and it is by this means only that the subject is disunited as a contradiction within itself.

FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE: KANT'S REFUTATION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE BEING OF GOD.

BY W. T. HARRIS.¹

In the history of philosophy we have a record of the discovery and exposition of a series of deep insights. The mastery of these insights is a sort of ascent of the individual into the insight of his race—and not the acquirement of mere information regarding the opinions of his fellow-men.

The constant lesson of social science is the dependence of the individual upon the aid of the community for the supply of his wants of food, clothing, and shelter. The dependence of the individual upon the race in spiritual matters of knowledge and wisdom is more wonderful. The science of nature and mind rests upon a vast mass of experience made up of the collected observations of mankind. Not merely the data of observation are included in this mass of experience, but the results of reflection on those data. Reflection concentrates experience, reduces it to unity. Each principle stands for many facts. The results of reflection are stated in the form of generalized principles and expressed in technical terms.

By availing one's self of these results of reflection, he can traverse the field of experience of the race in a very short time and arrive at the view of the world which the individual could not reach unaided, but the social whole of man has attained.

Without participating in the results of the reflection of his race, it would avail little that the individual could assist his own

¹ Read at the Concord School of Philosophy, August 3, 1881.

observation of facts by participation in the fund of sense-perceptions of the total of mankind. These sense-perceptions, without classification and generalization, would only confuse him all the more. The individual, unaided by the reflection of his fellows, already knows more facts than he can do anything with. He stands in the presence of an infinitely multiple world—no limit to the process of analysis which he may perform on the minutest piece of the world before him, no limit to the process of synthesis that he may make through discovering new realms to add to the ones he has already inventoried. The being that cannot generalize, cannot, in fact, observe what we call “facts,” although we are in the habit of assuming that mere sense-perception can perceive distinct facts. The unity which converts the series of sense-impressions into a perception of one object, is generalization. If we reflect on the form of a “fact,” we discover that it involves multiplicity, inner relations, to endless extent. It, moreover, belongs in a series, and has been severed from its connections to preceding and subsequent “facts” in the series. If one had taken a more comprehensive view, the fact would have included preceding elements or subsequent elements. The “fact,” therefore, is an arbitrary synthesis, grasping together these particular phases and no others, when it might have united more elements, or fewer elements. The swine that saw the apple fall saw a fact of very small scope, while Newton saw in the same fact the fact of universal gravitation—a fact that included the whole physical universe. The perception of a fact presupposes that the mind has cut off from the flow of events in time a portion and isolated it from the rest by means of attention. It implies, moreover, that the indefinite multiplicity within the limits cut off is united in one thought. To unite many in one is to perceive identity in the elements; it is to perceive a common relation. In an event we include the objects related to the realization of one purpose, and we include also the movements and activities that serve to determine in some way the same purpose. The perception of relations is called an act of reflection; it certainly is no act of direct perception, for it in some way perceives one direct element in another—reflected in that other, as it were. The relation involves two termini—a *from* and *to*—and it is a synthesis of these two termini in one relation. When we think the relation, both termini

hover before the mind, in unity. Direct perception only sunder, the termini. But such sundering does violence to the true nature of objectivity, for the latter is relative, even down to its ultimates, as our reflection teaches us. An isolated object is no terminus, is out of relation, and, therefore, possesses no common element by which it may be united with another. Hence it is, to all intents and purposes, a nothing; it cannot even occupy space or time without involving community with others, and hence relativity of being.

Since, therefore, the correct knowing of the world is a knowing of the relations of things, and since the knowing of the essential nature of these relations is the perceiving that the relations constitute the nature of the object, and these are the joint product of the reflection of the race, it follows that the participation of the individual in the results of reflection achieved by his fellow-men is essential to his arrival at the truth of things. Self-activity on his part, then, is necessary for the reception of the generalizations of others. Reflection is self-activity, and its results can be communicated only to beings capable of self-activity.

The individual cannot receive the generalizations of the race without making generalizations himself. The generalizations of others assist him by stimulating his activity and guiding it to the object. Without the demonstrated theorem in the geometry before us to guide us to the problem, and to stimulate us to think it out, we should have waited, perhaps, a lifetime for an occasion in which we should have stood face to face with the problem clear and distinct before us, eliminated from its complications and obstructing our progress as we undertake the accomplishment of some deed. Moreover, Euclid indicates the course of his analysis, the path of his thought from distinction to distinction, the synthetic steps which he takes to get the result laid down as the theorem. We follow, active in our minds, and it is our activity alone that enables us to follow him. Euclid points out the steps, but we must take them by our own intellectual effort. We receive only what we can think over or verify within ourselves, so that it seems as if we can receive no thought from another except what we create anew within ourselves.

If we are forced to rely upon our fellow-men for the essential part of what we accept as knowledge, it is evident that Faith is

the most important element in our spiritual life. It is necessary, however, not to overlook the fact of our self-activity. We are not passive recipients, and faith must not be taken in a narrow sense. We depend upon our fellow-men for most of the data that we possess regarding the world, and for most of the conclusions that thought has produced as inferences from the data. Here is the element of faith, but we must try to verify the data we receive by our own perceptions or by cross-examination and comparison with what we know through our own knowledge. Still more independent is our activity which is necessary to receive the conclusions which the reflection of others have reached regarding the world. If we receive them for all that they meant to the original thinkers, we shall see the internal necessity of thought as much as they did, and have as deep insight. If we accept their results as decisions of authority, without seeing their necessity for ourselves, of course our insight will be very far inferior to the insight of the original authority.

From this point of view we see the truth of the famous dictum of Saint Anselm, "*Credo ut intelligam*," and it seems to have a validity based on the nature of thought itself. Perhaps Anselm himself had a glimpse of this meaning which may be given to his paradox. "I believe [in the capacity of my fellow-men to see and report correctly the data of sense-perception, and to draw correct inferences from those data by means of reflection, and I have faith in what they report to me], in order that I may understand [*i. e.*, accepting their results, I have something to verify for myself, and may proceed, with that endowment of knowledge and insight from the race, to understand the world]." Whatever he may have meant, it is nevertheless true, that men do derive their view-of-the-world from the consense of their fellow-men. If one had to collect all his data for himself, and work out all his generalizations without aid, it is evident that he would get very little way into a knowledge of the world.

Since our view of the world is given us primarily by the human race, and is not first reached by independent observations, we may say that the light of our seeing, and the lenses through which we see things in nature and history, are borrowed from our fellow-men, and are matters belonging to the social community of men. The help that we get from our fellows is not a gift from mere

individuals, but is something generic. Ten men in combination are not merely ten times as strong as one man, but a hundred or a thousand times as strong. The united effort of a social whole is something incommensurable by the individual standard. Like the process of involution, the social process is a multiplication of each factor by all the rest, and not a mere addition or aggregate of parts. The individual is first reinforced by the total of society; next, in turn, he adds his mite to society—but not the elementary, unaided mite of his primitive self—he adds his contribution already reinforced by the social whole. Thus the social process is essentially a process of involution, a process of investment of talents and gifts to be returned with usury.

These reflections upon the utterance of Saint Anselm—“*Credo ut intelligam*”—suggest the point of view we should take in our study of the history of philosophy. The process of reading into authors what they have never thought is more likely to happen on the part of those who find only shallow and crude views in the systems of famous thinkers, than on the part of those who discover deep and still valid ideas.

Saint Anselm's famous proof of the being of God is an example of a statement of deep insight which has had the fate of being partially or wholly misunderstood by later thinkers, although it has been reproduced under other forms not suspected as identical with it.

One of the most famous of Kant's critical achievements is his attack upon the validity of the ontological proof of the existence of God, an attack upon the Cartesian form of Anselm's proof.

The dogma, as fixed by the Church, is accepted by Anselm as absolute truth, to begin with. Taking “Faith” in the sense already discussed, Anselm has faith in the Church as the representative of the human race in its most authoritative expression. It has the truth in the highest form that has been revealed to man. We, too, have a highest authority in the conviction of our time against which we do not venture to protest, but in whose name we challenge any conclusion whatsoever that is set up as opposed to it, though it claim logical justification. The “invisible Church,” which includes the communion of all wise and good of whatever age and clime, is at bottom the “consensus” (as Cudworth calls it) of leading minds as regards truth.

The thinking of the individual in philosophy, according to this view, should conform to this authority found in the consense of the Church. If it results in something contradictory, we must reject it, or, at least, re-examine its foundations. If an evolutionist in our time finds that his discoveries are subversive of the ethical prescripts of society, he rejects them or suppresses them. If he does not do it himself, his fellow-evolutionists will do it for him.

Saint Anselm, while accepting the dogmas of faith from the Church, holds that it is the business of the human intellect to try to comprehend them. He, therefore, takes up, in his "Proslogium,"¹ the idea of God, and seeks to find it among the presuppositions of the intellect. If the intellect bases all of its processes upon the assumption of the existence of God, it will be true that the fool, though he says in his heart that there is no God, at the same time presupposes God in the very act of setting forth the denial of him. Is God, then, the highest reality, presupposed as the necessary ground of whatever reality? This is the question that Anselm investigates.

The ultimate presupposition of the intellect is, to use his words, "*Id quo nihil majus cogitari potest*"—or that, than which, nothing greater can be conceived—not the thought of the greatest of existences (among other existences). It has been suggested (by Gaunilo, in the lifetime of Saint Anselm, and later by Kant and others) that the conception of a thing does not imply its corresponding existence—as though this were something that had not occurred to Anselm (or to Descartes, who thinks that the idea of a "most perfect being"² implies its existence). This refutation, therefore, proceeds upon the assumption that the ontological proof appealed to a suppressed major premise: "Whatever can be conceived as an idea in the mind must have a corresponding objective reality." This presupposition could not be in the mind of any sane human being for a moment, and certainly was not in the mind of Anselm or in that of Descartes. It is claimed by both that the thought of the existence of God is unique, and a thought whose reality is presupposed by all other thoughts, but that no other thoughts contain the ground of their real-

¹ See Appendix I to this article.

² See Appendix II to this article.

ity in themselves but only as grounded through this thought of God.

The form in which this thought retains its validity for us now is the thought of the totality. We all recognize at once the necessity of the existence of a totality as a precedent condition to the existence of a part. Whenever anything is posited as existent, it is at once presupposed that this existent is either in itself a whole or a part of a whole. The totality is an existent which possesses a reality in a higher sense than the part, or limited existence. For the limited existence owes some of its properties to the existences that are supposed to limit it—*i. e.*, to the environment. But both the limited existence and its environment are included in the totality, and all their reality is in the total.

If there is a part, there is a whole in which it exists, and which contains all of its reality and all of the reality of the other parts which limit it. The thought of a part contains the thought that it is transcended by a whole, a greater reality than it. No part could possibly exist unless there were an existence that transcended it; were it not so, then the part were incorrectly defined as a part; itself were the totality, and not a part.

Take the thinker who thinks the thought: if he knows himself to be a part, it must be because he knows of other existence than himself, and knows himself dependent. The thought presupposes the thinker of the thought, and they presuppose a totality as the basis of their existence, without saying as yet what this totality must be, as regards its nature. Whatever is found to be essentially and necessarily implied as the nature of a totality, must be posited as the essential presupposition of intellect or thought.

That, than which, there can be thought nothing greater, is the totality. The thought of the totality is not a merely subjective thought, but has a necessary reality corresponding to it. Any possible objection to this will presuppose the thought of a totality as the basis of its validity. Let it be objected by Gaunilo, or by Kant, that any thought whatever is subjective only, and that there can be no conclusion from it to the reality. The statement of this objection, it will be seen, nay, its very conception, rests upon the assumption that thought or intellect, or the conceptive faculty, is one side of an antithesis, standing over against an objective somewhat called "reality" which is to be distinguished from any

and all conceptions of it. This thought or conception, therefore, transcends itself and thinks a totality of subjective and objective opposed to it. All thought of quality or quiddity involves a limit in which two factors appear—the limiting and the limited.

Gaunilo and Kant¹ both attempt to refute the ontological argument, therefore, by presupposing it as the basis of their discrimination between conception and reality.

That a totality must necessarily exist is the basis of all thought, whether it be dogmatic, or sceptical, or critical. No part can exist by itself; for then it were the all, the totality itself. If there be an ego which thinks, even if it be the ego of the fool (*insipiens*), then there is a whole of existence. This does not as yet say anything of the nature of this whole; it may be the fool himself, for aught that is yet affirmed. It is further examination of the presuppositions of the thought of the totality which we need to determine for us what kind of a being this necessary being is, and whether it is worthy to be called God, or anything else.

The thought of “*Quo majus cogitari nequit*” is not yet the thought of God, although it is the foundation of it. Whatever is implied as necessarily appertaining to the existence of the totality must be thought as necessarily appertaining to the character of the absolute existence, for the total is absolute, or by itself, and not co-ordinated with any other existence. The thought of the totality is the thought of an independent being. As regards its attributes, or qualities, or its properties—all, in short, called its determinations—these must be the product of its own activity, for they cannot be produced upon it by its environment, simply because it has no environment.

The answer to the question as to its nature, then, is that the totality is self-determined, so far as it has determinations or distinctions within it or belonging to it. Any totality that had a nature impressed upon it from some other source than its own energy would be dependent and presuppose a complement outside itself, and thus it would not be the total, but an element of the total. The nature of the total is Self-determination.

It is very important that the technical terms in which this problem is stated be those implying dependence or independence,

¹ See Appendix III to this article.

or determination and self-determination. Many categories of thought have been used in the history of philosophy to express these distinctions, and, by reason of some ambiguity of import, have lost their logical hold on the mind. The terms Finite, Phenomenal, Partial, Transient, and the like, have been used as designations under which one was supposed to think the dependent. It was thought that from these could be inferred as ground their correlatives: The Infinite, or the Noumenal, or the Total, or the Eternal, in a sense that would be adequate as designations of the Divine Being. But all of these, including that of the Total, lack speculative content, or are ambiguous as regards it. Even that of "the total" may be taken immediately as an aggregate of finitudes or as a "*Tout ensemble*," a merely quantitative collection. Within a quantitative whole the parts have no essential relation, but only indifference towards each other.

It may be asked why we are bound to consider the totality as under the category of dependence or of independence rather than as under that of finite or infinite, etc.; and the answer is that the category of dependence or independence is the category of essential relation, while the others are merely subjective distinctions as ordinarily used, and carry no objective implication with them. If something is dependent, it implies a greater reality than itself, of necessity. If finite, or phenomenal, or part, or transient imply a higher reality, it is because they contain the idea of dependence in them. It is the latter category alone that is not ambiguous and liable to be understood in a subjective import. It was the use of the term "*Majus*" by Saint Anselm that made it possible to misunderstand his argument and give it a quantitative interpretation. It was the use of the term "*Perfect*" by Descartes that made it possible to misinterpret it and to give to it a merely subjective validity, as a discrimination implying no objective complement of reality. It made it possible to regard those thoughts as co-ordinate with other thoughts. Gaunilo instanced the island "*Atlantis*," whose ideal conception did not in the least prove its actual existence. Kant instanced the idea of a hundred dollars, the conception of which as being in my pocket did not at all enhance my actual wealth. In neither case was the instance an example of a dependent being whose actuality was the total and independent being. On the contrary, their actuality itself

would be only the protasis whose apodosis would be some independent being.

The dependent being posits, as necessary ground of it, the independent being. This is not to be thought as another dependent being, which, again, depends upon another dependent being, and so on to infinity. For the complement upon which the finite or dependent is affirmed to depend, if itself dependent, belongs to the dependent already posited, and with it constitutes the dependent which demands the independent upon which it can repose. The dependent cannot depend upon a dependent again, because the dependent has nothing of its own to give to the dependent. All that it gives is merely transmitted from the self-supported or independent. The series must be thought as complete, or, if thought as incomplete, we have the thought of the dependent by itself, without its complement, and hence as without anything to depend on, and consequently as NOT-dependent, or as independent already. It is impossible to escape this necessity of thought by any sophism or subterfuge—even under the respectable name of “Antinomy of Pure Reason.” We always find ourselves face to face with the dilemma: Either the dependent depends upon that which can yield it support of its own (and is a final term, for this reason, because self-supported), or else the dependent depends upon nothing that can give it any support, and hence it is not dependent upon anything, but is really independent so far as it is at all. To think an infinite series does not help the matter at all. The question always recurs: Does this being really depend or not? To think a series of terms in the complement of the dependent term is a purely arbitrary matter, and is a matter of division simply. You may think the complement as made up of a quantum infinitely divisible if you choose—nothing prevents—it is indifferent to the question. It is the same whether we say it once or repeat it forever, says Simplicius in regard to the sophism of the “Achilles,” which depends upon the infinite division of space and time—Achilles being unable to overtake the tortoise while you are engaged in completing your division of space into its ultimates! The conception of a “*Regressus in Infinitum*” is the alternative set up by Kant in his antinomies in order to humble the intellect into admitting the insolubility of the problems of pure reason. All such forms of

Regressus or Progressus already presuppose the actual solution of the antinomy by the intelligence that can state such a Progressus as necessary. A *Progressus in Infinitum* is set up only when the intellect discovers a necessary connection between two terms and then tries to think them as in succession. After A must be thought B, and after B must be thought A, again. Here is a *Progressus in Infinitum*: for you cannot leave off with either term; each implies the other as its limit. In that case the thought is that of self-determination, and self-determination is therefore the solution of the antinomy. This will become evident if one considers it as follows: (a) A implies B; (b) but B implies A; (c) hence, A implies itself (through the implication of B); (d) and, likewise, B implies itself (through the implication of A).

It reduces to the general formula: A determines B; B determines A; hence, A determines itself through B.

While the conception of a dependent being implies the conception of a corresponding including totality that is independent, the conception of a dependent being by no means implies the existence of that dependent being. It may or may not exist, it is entirely contingent. *If* the dependent being exists, *then* the independent being exists which is its ground.

What else follows from the concept of an independent being? That is to say: what attributes if any must necessarily be predicated of a being that is a total and independent being? Are its attributes to resemble such as we attribute to a dependent being? An answer to these questions ought to settle for us whether the totality is divine or diabolical, or of an indifferent nature.

First, is the totality anything more than the aggregate of finite existences? If not, it is merely a quantitative sum and no unity in a qualitative sense. Such a totality, though it were the reality, would be no concept of God, for it would be the sum of realities and not the sum of reality. Each reality within the all would be independent. But this would imply its limitation by the others, and it would thus be qualitative instead of quantitative. Each would have an environment. Each would be what it is because of its environment, and then the All would determine each, and, therefore, the All would be the source of the determination of each, and would, therefore, destroy the independence of the sep-

arate realities. The total, therefore, cannot be a quantitative aggregate of separate, independent realities.

In place of such indifferent realities, we should have a negative unity—that is to say, a unity in which the parts or particular realities lose themselves and in which their reality is destroyed. The unity would determine all the parts within it as a totality of conditions is conceived to determine each thing, or necessitate its nature.

This standpoint of necessity is a deeper reflection than that which conceives the totality as an aggregate of independent realities. The latter view denies all validity to universals and makes them a mere convenient artifice adopted by the mind for classification. Each atomic thing is regarded by this theory as a plenum of reality, and all else has only a conceptual existence. But such a thought cannot bear the test of reflection. Such a world of independent things loses its aspect of independence when we think it more carefully, and is seen to be a world of relative existences—each thing dependent on its environment. In the place of independent, self-existent things, we have dependence upon relation to others—external necessity. According to this view, if you destroy a grain of sand you destroy the equilibrium of the universe of matter.

If the totality of conditions determines or necessitates each thing to be what it is and will not let it become other, there is no freedom on the part of individual realities and no self-activity. But the totality, being a determining unity, and being itself—the all, cannot be co-ordinate to anything, and still less subordinate to anything else. Its activity is accordingly self-activity—or activity originating in itself and by itself and for its own purpose. This makes the totality a free activity.

The doctrine of Fate or necessity, therefore, presupposes freedom as its ground, freedom as the form of the activity of the whole, or totality. Necessity is conceived as the relation existing between the part and the whole—the part gets its determinations from the whole. Any finite object like an atom or atomic thing finds its limits derived from outside of it, and yet those limits are its quality, its distinguishing characteristics, its individuality, in short. This makes the essential quality or quiddity of a thing a relativity. But this is so only because the necessity

or the total is assumed as having all the energy or determining-power.

The concept of "*Quo majus cogitari nequit*," therefore, involves the thought of a self-determining being as the absolute. With this thought firmly fixed in one's mind as the ultimate presupposition, the idea of the totality is not an idea of a diabolic, nor an indifferent being, but the idea of a divine being in the sense taught in religion. A negative unity in which all things lost their individuality, and which was itself devoid of all attributes and relations, would be diabolical in its conduct towards the existences of the world: for it would be unmerciful towards them and destructive of them. Indifferent to all their distinctions, it would serve the good the same treatment that it offered the bad.

"Shadow and sunlight are the same,
The vanished gods to me appear,
And ONE TO ME ARE SHAME AND FAME."

But a self-determining being as the Absolute or total would be a creative being; for there is involved in the determination of the self an activity, the determining; and likewise a passivity, the determined. But the duality of determining and determined, of active and passive, cannot be absolute or final, for the reason that it is the self that is both. The self determines itself, therefore, not as passive—as determined—but as active as determining. If this were not so there would be self-contradiction, nay, even self-annihilation; for the activity would act simply to produce the extinguishment of activity.

This thought of the necessity of equality in the two phases that appear in a self-determining being is the thought which develops a concrete idea of the divine nature.

Only by the sameness of the second phase with the first phase can the first have identity with itself: only by the identity of the determined with the determining—the identity of the passive with the active—can the self-determined being be and remain itself. This necessity of thought is the ground of the proof that the totality which all thought presupposes is God, and not pure nought or Brahm. The self-determining, therefore, determines itself as self-determining; that is to say, the self-determined determines itself, and is thus identical with the first self-determining.

In the second phase, the first reflects its independence, freedom, and self-activity.

But there is another phase: the self-determined that makes itself self-determining has its object or passivity to annul in order to become identical with the first. This is a process of making real its passivity and its activity as annulling that passivity. Thus arises a world that contains both elements—fate or passivity (determined-ness) and activity (determining-ness). It appears as a Creation beginning with chaos or pure space and rising through nature to man; with man begins the realm of the manifestation of freedom or the self-determining-ness. In the world of humanity, as developed throughout the cosmos in an infinity of worlds, there is an ascent into the identity with the First. The First is primordially self-active; the Second is BECOME self-active, but from eternity; the third is BECOMING self-active, and is in all stages of progress, from the passivity of chaos, or pure space, up to the most perfect humanity that has developed on any one of the infinite number of worlds.

The relation of the First to the second is that of freedom, because it is created in the very act of freedom. The relation of the second to the first is that of freedom; for it has annulled its derivativeness from eternity and is free activity; the relation of the third is that of ascent into freedom, having begun in passivity or nature, and received energy or freedom from the second.¹

Whatever one may find by investigation of the necessary presuppositions of the absolute self-determined being will be also ultimate data of consciousness even for the fool (*insipiens*). If these conclusions from the logical presuppositions are not warranted, it makes no difference so far as the validity of the argument of Anselm is concerned. Whatever does follow, is the idea of the divine—and it is impossible to escape having some idea of the divine.

The principle of "*Progressus in Infinitum*" has been referred to as used by Kant in establishing his antinomies.

It has been used in negative philosophy ever since the time of the Sophists, and in our own time it has been adopted from Kant

¹ In an article on "The Personality of God" in the "North American Review" for September, 1880, I have treated this subject further.

by Sir William Hamilton and his disciples, and again by Herbert Spencer. The inconceivability of an infinite progress is made a sufficient ground for pronouncing the inconceivability of anything that may involve an infinite progress. Self-Existence (by Herbert Spencer), the infinitude of space (by Hamilton), and all notions that relate to the divine, are made unthinkable because they imply what is inconceivable. But, in the first place, there is nothing in the universe that does not involve an infinite progress in some shape or other; in the second place, the infinite progress, so far from being inconceivable, is the most conceivable of ideas. In fact, it is an element in all that is conceivable.

Since any finite thing is divisible, and division does not change the nature of that which is divided, so as to make the parts reached by division indivisible, it follows that the operation may be repeated *ad infinitum*, or, in other words, that things are infinitely divisible. Hence nothing can be conceived at all if involving an infinite progress prevents us conceiving it.

Moreover, since the conception of quantity is the basis of the conception of thing in general, and quantity involves the unity of the ideas of discreteness and continuity, it follows that infinite divisibility is inseparable from the conception of thing, but that it makes its thought possible through the fact that infinite divisibility is another name for the union of discreteness and continuity—the elements or factors of the idea of quantity. It will be seen that this holds true not only of space but also of time, quantity being constituent of both thoughts. Remove quantity and endeavor to think things or events: you will remove the ideas of discreteness and continuity, and your object will become devoid of succession and extension. It will then become devoid also of all relation to others or to itself, and will then become in very fact inconceivable—but inconceivable because it is a non-entity, and a non-entity cannot be conceived without elevating it out of its non-entity into at least a conceptual existence. All forms of relativity involve infinite progress, because Relativity involves Identity and Difference in unity. If you undertake to think identity and difference in succession, you have an infinite progress—and this is only a result of trying to think the conceptual elements of Relativity singly. In thinking each, its other appears as the attribute of it. Each “shines,” as Hegel says, “in the

other," or is reflected in it. Hence, in thinking relativity we imagine, first, two terms, one of which depends upon the other; next we think dependence also in the second term, and it, too, depends upon a third; approaching the third, we apply, again, the same category of dependence, and at once the depended-upon (*i. e.*, the complement of the dependent) flits away into a more remote term. The basis of this thought-play is the necessity of thinking difference as well as identity, and of thinking them in the same term. The naive intellect, unaware of its laws of reflection, fails to note the implied unity of the two elements in one being. When it recognizes the necessity of the unity in one being of both conceptual elements, it changes both into the higher concept and finds no longer the progress or succession. The thought of quantity is infinite as regards discreteness and continuity. The thought of Relativity is infinite as regards the thoughts of difference and identity. But the true idea of relativity is self-relation, for that is the union in one of difference and identity. The inconceivability of the infinite regress of causality—the effect presupposing a cause that is again an effect and again posits a cause antecedent, etc.—is solved the moment we think cause and effect in one being and have *causa sui*. Hegel uses "Begriff" to mean this idea of *causa sui*, or the self-determined being.

The solution of the Infinite Progress is the solution of the difficulty in the way of acceptance of Anselm's proof of the being of God. We have all of the elements present in our mind, but do not recognize them. We discriminate and yet unite the terms, affirming, on the strength of our perception of the necessary unity, that neither is a whole without the other, but separating them in order to comply with our insight into the necessary distinction. We posit the subjective as incomplete and as implying an objective which is different from the concept. This difference from the concept is conceived as independence of the concept—"The concept of a hundred dollars does not add anything to my possessions." But there is an objective, and hence the subjective is characterized as defective. The objective is distinctly posited as independent of the subjective, and as not conditioned by the latter. Here is, therefore, the necessity of the objectivity of one of our ideas made the basis of our discrimination between another

idea and its object. We see the independence of the objective, and, never doubting the objectivity of this our idea of objectivity, we proceed to discriminate between all concepts and their corresponding reality. The totality is the union of subjective and objective; this totality is presupposed as the basis of our critical attitude when we side with Kant or Gaunilo. Let go the conviction of the unity of thought and being in this, its last stronghold, and at once all idea of the distinction between thought and being vanishes, for the idea of objective being vanishes utterly, and there is now no distinction possible between thoughts that are adequate to the existing reality and those that are not. Hence we have a dialectical procedure in Hegel's meaning and not in the Kantian import of the term dialectic. We find ourselves in the dilemma that makes us affirm an objectivity corresponding to our thought, and, if we take the horn of denial, we are likewise affirming the same thing as the basis of our denial. As already shown, they attempt to refute the ontological argument by denying necessary objectivity to *Quo majus cogitari nequit*, or to the thought of a totality, but they presuppose in this all validity for their discrimination between a mere concept and its corresponding reality, and hence they parade their idea of reality as of superior validity to the idea of the totality as expressed by Anselm and Descartes. But it is only the same idea of totality, after all, which is in the thought of Anselm and Kant. Anselm calls this idea of totality God, and finds in it the ultimate presupposition of all thought; Kant posits a reality which does not correspond to the concept, and, therefore, posits the reality of the totality as including both subjective and objective.

APPENDIX I.

PASSAGES from "Saint Anselm's Proslogium." (From the translation in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Volume viii., beginning at page 529; the refutation of Gaunilo and Anselm's rejoinder begin at page 699 of the same volume. Translated by Rev. J. S. Maginnis.)

From III. *That God cannot be conceived not to exist.*

"Indeed, so truly does this exist, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For it is possible to conceive of the existence of something which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than that which can be conceived not to exist. Wherefore,

¹ See Appendix IV to this article.

if that, than which a greater cannot be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, then this something, than which a greater cannot be conceived, is something than which a greater can be conceived; which is a contradiction. So truly, therefore, does something exist, than which a greater cannot be conceived, that it is impossible to conceive this not to exist. And this art Thou, O Lord our God! so truly, therefore, dost thou exist, O Lord my God, that thou canst not be conceived not to exist. For this there is the highest reason. For, if any mind could conceive of anything better than thou art, then the creature could ascend above the Creator and become his judge; which is supremely absurd. Everything else, indeed, which exists besides thee, can be conceived not to exist. Thou alone, therefore, of all things, hast being in the truest sense, and, consequently, in the highest degree; for everything else that is, exists not so truly, and has, consequently, being only in an inferior degree. Why, therefore, has the fool said in his heart there is no God? since it is so manifest to an intelligent mind, that of all things thine existence is the highest reality. Why, unless because he is a fool, and destitute of reason?"

From XV. *That the greatness of God transcends conception.*

"Therefore, O Lord, not only art thou that than which nothing greater can be conceived, but thy greatness transcends all conception. For since it is possible to conceive that there is something whose greatness transcends all conception, if thou art not this very thing, then something greater than thou art can be conceived, which is impossible."

From XX. *That God is before all things, and beyond (ultra) all things, even things which are eternal.*

"Therefore Thou dost fill and embrace all things; Thou art before and beyond all things. Before all things, because, before they were brought forth, Thou art. But how art Thou beyond all things? for, in what way art Thou beyond things which have no end? Is it that these things can in no wise exist without thee, but that Thou wouldst nevertheless exist even if these should return to nothing? for in this way Thou art in a certain sense beyond these things. It is also that these things can be conceived to have an end, but that no end can be conceived of Thee? For in this way they have an end in a certain sense, but in no sense can this be affirmed of Thee. And surely that which, in no sense, has an end, is beyond that which has an end in some sense. Dost Thou transcend all things, even eternal things, in this sense also, that Thine entire eternity and theirs is present before Thee; while of their eternity they see not as yet that which is to come, and behold no longer that which is past? For, in this way Thou art always beyond these things; since Thou art always present at that point, or rather that point is always present to Thee, at which they have not arrived" [i. e., The *esse* of "Quo majus non cogitari potest" transcends any *fieri*].

From XXIII. *That this supreme good is equally the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; that he is the only necessary being; that he is the whole, the absolute, the only good.*

"Thou art this good, O God; the Father; and thy Word that is thy Son, is this good. For in the Word, by which thou dost declare thyself, there can be nothing else than what thou art, nor anything either greater or less, since thy Word is as true as thou art veracious. And therefore thy Word is, as thou art, truth itself, and not another truth than thou art; and so simple art thou that nothing else than what thou art can spring from thee. This same good is love identical with that which is common to thee and

to thy Son; that is to say, it is the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son. For this same love is not inferior to thee nor to thy Son; for, so far as thou lovest thyself and the Son, and so far as the Son loves thee and himself, so great art thou and he; this cannot be anything different from thyself and thy Son, which is not unequal to thyself and to him; nor can anything proceed from absolute simplicity, but that itself from which it proceeds. But that which each is, this the whole Trinity is, at one and the same time, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, since each is no other than simple and absolute unity, and supreme, absolute simplicity, which can neither be multiplied nor be now one thing and then another. Moreover, there is but one necessary being; and he in whom is all good is this one necessary being; nay, he is himself the whole, the one supreme and the only good."

The following passages from the original will convey an idea of Anselm's style and use of technique:

From Chapter II. "Bonum, quo majus nihil cogitari potest, intelligit utique quod audit, et quod intelligit utique in ejus intellectu est, etiam si non intelligit illud esse.

"Convincitur ergo insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid bonum quo majus cogitari nequit, quia hoc quum audit intelligit, et quidquid intelligitur in intellectu est. Ad certe id quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim quo majus cogitari non potest, in solo intellectu foret, utique eo quo majus cogitari non potest, majus cogitari potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re."

From Chapter III. "Hoc ipsum autem sic vere est, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. Nam potest cogitari aliquid esse, quod non possit cogitari non esse, quod majus est utique eo, quod non esse cogitari potest. Quare si id, quo majus nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse, id ipsum quo majus cogitari nequit, non est id quo majus cogitari nequit, quod convenire non potest. Vere ergo est aliquid, quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse, et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster."

APPENDIX II.

PASSAGES from Descartes' "Third Meditation." (Translated by W. R. Walker. *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, vol. iv.)

"Now, it is a thing manifest by the natural light that there should be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect: for whence can the effect derive its reality, if not from its cause? and how can this cause communicate it, if it has it not in itself? And thence it follows, not only that nothing cannot produce anything, but also that what is more perfect—that is, which contains in itself more reality cannot be a consequence of and depend upon the less perfect; and this truth is not only clear and evident in the effects which have that reality which philosophers call actual or formal, but also in the ideas in which are considered only the reality which they call objective: for example, the stone which has not yet been, not only cannot now begin to be if it is not produced by something possessing in itself formally and eminently all that enters into the composition of the stone—that is, containing in itself the very things, or others more excellent, which are in the stone; and heat cannot be produced in a subject which was before devoid of it, except by something of an order, of a degree, or of a kind, at least, as perfect as heat; and so of other things.

"Now, among all those ideas within me, besides that which represents me to myself, as to which there cannot here be any difficulty, there is another which represents to

me a God; others, things corporeal and inanimate; others, angels; others, animals and others, finally, which represent to me men like myself. But as regards the ideas which represent to me other men, or animals, or angels, I easily conceive that they might be formed by the mixture and composition of other ideas which I have of things corporeal and of God, although outside of me there should be no other men in the world, neither any animals, nor any angels. And as regards the ideas of things corporeal, I do not recognize in them anything so great or excellent, that might not, as it seems to me, come from myself; for if I consider them more closely and examine them in the same fashion in which I yesterday examined the idea of the wax, I find that there occur but very few things which I conceive clearly and distinctly—namely, magnitude, or rather extension in length, breadth, and depth, the figure which results from the termination of this extension, the situation which variously shaped bodies maintain among themselves, and the movement or change of this situation, to which may be added substance, duration, and number.

“There remains only the idea of God, as to which it is necessary to consider whether there is anything in it which could come from myself. By the term “God,” I understand a substance infinite, eternal, immovable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which myself and all other things that are (if it be true that there are any that exist) were created and produced. But these prerogatives are so great and exalted, that, the more attentively I consider them, the less am I persuaded that the idea I have of them can derive its origin from myself alone. And, consequently, the necessary conclusion from all that I have before said is that God exists: for although the idea of substance is in me from the very fact that I am a substance, I, who am a finite being, should not, however, have the idea of an infinite substance, if it had not been put within me by some really infinite substance.

“And I ought not to imagine that I do not conceive the infinite by a real idea, but only by the negation of what is finite, just as I comprehend rest and darkness by the negation of motion and light; since, on the contrary, I see manifestly that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite, and, consequently, that I have in some fashion within me the notion of the infinite rather than of the finite—that is, of God rather than of myself; for how is it possible that I can know that I doubt and that I desire—that is, that something is wanting to me, and that I am not altogether perfect—if I had not in me any idea of a being more perfect than my own, by the comparison with which I may know the defects of my nature?

“And it cannot be said that perhaps this idea of God is materially false, and, consequently, that I could derive it from nothing; that is, that it might be in me by reason of my defect, as I have just said of the ideas of heat and cold and other like things; for, on the contrary, this idea being very clear and distinct, and containing in itself more objective reality than any other, there is nothing which of itself is more true, or which can be less suspected of error and falsity.

“This idea, I say, of a Being sovereignly perfect and infinite is very true; for although, perhaps, one might pretend that such a Being does not exist, it cannot, however, be pretended that the idea of him does not represent something real, as I have just said of the idea of cold. It is also very clear and distinct, since all that my mind conceives clearly and distinctly as real and true, and which contains in itself any perfection, is entirely contained and included in this idea. And this remains none the less true because I do not comprehend the infinite, and there are in God an infinitude of things which I cannot comprehend, or perhaps even reach by any stretch of the

mind; for it is of the nature of the infinite that I, who am finite and limited, cannot comprehend it; and it is enough that I understand this, and judge that all the things which I conceive clearly, and in which I know there is some perfection, and perhaps also an infinitude of others of which I am ignorant, are in God formally or eminently, in order that the idea which I have of them may be the most true, the most clear, and the most distinct of all those that are in my mind.

"But it may also be that I am something more than I imagine, and that all the perfections I attribute to the nature of a God are in some fashion potentially in me, although they are not yet brought forth and are not made apparent by their actions. Indeed, I already experience that by degrees my knowledge is increasing and being perfected; and I see nothing which could prevent its being thus more and more increased to infinity; or why, being thus increased and perfected, I should not be able to acquire in this way all the other perfections of the divine nature; or, finally, why the power which I have for the acquisition of these perfections, if it be true that this power is now in me, should not be sufficient to produce the ideas of them. However, regarding the matter a little more closely, I discover that this cannot be; for, in the first place, although it were true that my knowledge every day acquires new degrees of perfection, and that there were in my nature many things potentially which are not actually there, yet all these advantages do not belong to or approach in any sort the idea I have of the Divinity, in which there is nothing that is only potential, but everything is there actually and in reality. And, indeed, is it not an infallible and very certain argument for the imperfection of my knowledge, that it grows gradually and increases by degrees? Moreover, although my knowledge should grow from more to more, yet I ought not, therefore, to conceive that it could be actually infinite, since it would never reach a point of perfection so high that it would not be still capable of acquiring a much larger increase. But I conceive God actually infinite in so high a degree that nothing can be added to the sovereign perfection which he possesses. And, finally, I comprehend clearly that the objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a being which exists only potentially; which, properly speaking, is nothing, but only by a formal or actual being.

"But perhaps this being on whom I depend is not God, and I may have been produced either by my parents, or by some other cause less perfect than he. Far from it—that cannot be; for, as I have already said, it is very evident that there should be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect; and, consequently, since I am a thing that thinks and that has in itself some idea of God, whatever may be the cause of my being, it must be admitted that this cause is also a thing that thinks, and that it was in itself the idea of all the perfections that I attribute to God. Then we may investigate anew whether this cause derives its origin and existence from itself or from anything. For, if it derives its origin from itself, it follows, from the reasons I have before advanced, that this cause is God: since, having the virtue of being and of existing by itself, it must unquestionably have the power of actually possessing all the perfections of which it has in itself the ideas; that is to say, all those that I conceive to be in God. But if it derives its existence from some other cause than itself, it will be asked once more, for the same reason, as to this second cause, whether it exists of itself or is from another cause, until, step by step, we arrive at length at a final cause, which will be found to be God. And it is very manifest that in this there cannot be progress to the infinite, since the question here is not so much as to the cause which before produced me as to that which now preserves me."

APPENDIX III.

PASSAGES from "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason," "Transcendental Dialectic," Book II., chap. iii., section 4 (translation of Meiklejohn) "Of the Impossibility of the Ontological Proof of the Existence of God."

"If, in an identical judgment, I annihilate the predicate in thought and retain the subject, a contradiction is the result; and hence I say, the former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if I suppress both subject and predicate in thought, no contradiction arises; for there is nothing at all, and therefore no means of forming a contradiction. To suppose the existence of a triangle and not that of its three angles, is self-contradictory; but to suppose the non-existence of both triangle and angles is perfectly admissible. And so is it with the conception of an absolutely necessary being. Annihilate its existence in thought, and you annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates; how, then, can there be any room for contradiction? Externally, there is nothing to give rise to a contradiction, for a thing cannot be necessary externally; nor internally, for, by the annihilation or suppression of the thing itself, its internal properties are also annihilated. God is omnipotent—that is a necessary judgment. His omnipotence cannot be denied if the existence of a Deity is posited—the existence, that is, of an infinite being, the two conceptions being identical. But when you say, God does not exist, neither omnipotence nor any other predicate is affirmed; they must all disappear with the subject, and in this judgment there cannot exist the least self-contradiction.

"It is affirmed that there is one, and only one, conception in which the non-being or annihilation of the object is self-contradictory, and this is the conception of an *ens realissimum*. It possesses, you say, all reality, and you feel yourselves justified in admitting the possibility of such a being. (This I am willing to grant for the present, although the existence of a conception which is not self-contradictory is far from being sufficient to prove the possibility of an object.) Now, the notion of all reality embraces in it that of existence; the notion of existence lies, therefore, in the conception of this possible thing. If this thing is annihilated in thought, the internal possibility of the thing is also annihilated, which is self-contradictory.

"I answer: It is absurd to introduce—under whatever term disguised—into the conception of the thing, which is to be cogitated solely in reference to its possibility, the conception of its existence. If this is admitted, you will have apparently gained the day, but in reality have enounced nothing but a mere tautology. I ask, is the proposition, this or that thing (which I am admitting to be possible) exists, an analytical or a synthetical proposition? If the former, there is no addition made to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its existence; but either the conception in your minds is identical with the thing itself, or you have supposed the existence of a thing to be possible, and then inferred its existence from its internal possibility—which is but a miserable tautology. The word reality in the conception of the thing, and the word existence in the conception of the predicate, will not help you out of the difficulty. For, supposing you were to term all positing of a thing reality, you have thereby posited the thing with all its predicates in the conception of the subject and assumed its actual existence, and this you merely repeat in the predicate. But if you confess, as every reasonable person must, that every existential proposition is synthetical, how can it be maintained that the predicate of existence cannot be denied with contradiction—a property which is the characteristic of analytical propositions alone?

"I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end forever to this sophistical mode

of argumentation by a strict definition of the conception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate (a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing) resists almost all the endeavors of explanation and illustration. A logical predicate may be what you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a judgment. But the determination of a conception is a predicate, which adds to and enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the conception.

"Being is evidently not a real predicate—that is, a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, God is omnipotent, contains two conceptions which have a certain object or content; the word *is*, is no additional predicate—it merely indicates the relation of the predicate to the subject. Now, if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one) and say God is, or, there is a God, I add no new predicate to the conception of God; I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its predicates—I posit the object in relation to my conception. The content of both is the same; and there is no addition made to the conception, which expresses merely the possibility of the object, by my cogitating the object—in the expression, it is—as absolutely given or existing. Thus the real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars contains no more than a hundred possible dollars, for, as the latter indicate the conception, and the former the object, on the supposition that the content of the former was greater than that of the latter, my conception would not be an expression of the whole object, and would consequently be an inadequate conception of it. In another sense (in my possessions), however, it may be said that there is more in a hundred real dollars than in a hundred possible dollars—that is, in the mere conception of them. For the real object—the dollars—is not analytically contained in my conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my conception (which is merely a determination of my mental state), although this objective reality—this existence—apart from my conception, does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars.

"By whatever, and by whatever number of, predicates—even to the complete determination of it—I may cogitate a thing, I do not in the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the statement, this thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more than what was cogitated in my conception, would exist, and I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence. If I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one, the mode of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing exists; on the contrary, the thing exists—if it exists at all—with the same defect as that cogitated in its conception; otherwise not that which was cogitated, but something different, exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the highest reality, without defect or imperfection, the question still remains—whether this being exists or not? For, although no element is wanting in the possible real content of my conception, here is a defect in its relation to my mental state—that is, I am ignorant whether the cognition of the object indicated by the conception is possible *a posteriori*. And here the cause of the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the question regarded an object of sense merely, it would be impossible for me to confound the conception with the existence of a thing. For the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general conditions of experience; while the existence of the object permits

me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of actual experience. At the same time, this connection with the world of experience does not in the least augment the conception, although a possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind. But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is not to be wondered at that we should find ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility.

"Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the case of sensuous objects, this is attained by their connection according to empirical laws with some one of my perceptions; but there is no means of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought, because it must be cognized completely *a priori*. But all our knowledge of existence (be it immediately by perception, or by inferences connecting some object with a perception) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience—which is in perfect unity with itself; and although an existence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a hypothesis, the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining.

"The notion of a supreme being is, in many respects, a highly useful idea; but, for the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things. It is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being which we do not know to exist. The analytical criterion of possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions, cannot be denied it. But the connection of real properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an *a priori* judgment cannot be formed, because these realities are not presented to us specifically; and, even if this were to happen, a judgment would still be impossible, because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the world of experience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong. And thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt to establish, upon *a priori* grounds, the possibility of this sublime ideal being.

"The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient; and we may as well hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash account."

APPENDIX IV.

PASSAGES from "Hegel's Encyclopædia," §§ 49, 50, 51, "the second attitude of thought towards the objective world," treating of the Kantian philosophy. (Translation of Wallace.)

"The third object of the Reason is God; He also must be known and evaluated in terms of thought. But, in comparison with an unalloyed identity, any evaluation in precise terms seems to the understanding to be a limit, and a negation: so that all reality must be invested with boundlessness or indeterminateness. Accordingly, God, when he is defined to be the sum of all realities, the most real of beings, turns into a mere abstraction. And the only head under which that most real of real things, or abstract identity, can be brought into articulate form, is the equally abstract category of Being. These are the two elements, an abstract identity, on one hand, which is spoken of in this place as the Notion; and Being on the other, which Reason seeks to reconcile into unity. And their union is the ideal of Reason."

"To carry out this union, two ways or two forms are admissible. Either we may begin with Being and proceed to the abstraction called Thought; or, the movement may begin with the abstraction and end in Being."

"The other way of union, by which we seek to realize the Ideal of Reason, is to set out from the abstractum of Thought and seek to characterize it; for which purpose Being is the only available term. This is the method of the Ontological proof. The opposition, which is here presented solely from the subjective side, lies between Thought and Being; whereas, in the first way of junction, Being is common to the two sides of the antithesis, and the contrast lies between individualized and universal. Understanding meets this second way with what is implicitly the same objection as it met the first. As it denied that the empirical involves the specialization, which specialization in this instance is Being. In other words, it says: Being cannot be deduced from the Notion by any analysis."

"The unexampled favor and acceptance which attended Kant's criticism of the Ontological proof was undoubtedly due to the illustration which he made use of. To mark the difference between Thought and Being, he took the instance of a hundred sovereigns, which, for anything it matters to the Notion, are the same hundred whether they are real or only possible, though the difference of the two cases is very perceptible in their effect on a man's purse. Nothing can be more obvious than that anything we only think or fancy is not on that account actual; and everybody is aware that a conception, and even a notion, is no match for Being. Still, it may not unfairly be styled a barbarism in language, when the name of Notion is given to things like a hundred sovereigns. And, putting that mistake aside, those who like to taunt the philosophic idea with the difference between Being and Thought might have admitted that philosophers were not wholly ignorant of the fact. Can there be anything pettier in knowledge than this? Above all, it is well to remember, when we speak of God, that we have an object of another kind than any hundred sovereigns, and unlike any particular notion, conceit, or whatever else it may be styled. The very nature of everything finite is expressed by saying that its Being in time and space is discrepant from its Notion. God, on the contrary, ought to be what can only be 'thought as existing;' His Notion involves Being. It is this unity of the Notion and Being that constitutes the notion of God."